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Abstract 
This paper discusses some of the main characteristics of modernism and 
its influence on science and in particular theology. Descartes7 approach to 
reason, "I think; therefore I am," and the Newtonian mechanism 
(mathematical principles of Natural Philosophy) prepared the way for 
deifying reason during the Enlightenment. Modernism became the foundation 
on which the so-called "scientific paradigm" was built. "Scientists" were 
regarded as people who could produce exact and unambiguous results. This 
paradigm framed our intellectual, social, and theological thoughts and 
influenced scholars to become paternalistic and imperialistic, serving exclusive 
goals and propagating reductionistic truths. A new paradigm has developed 
which has adopted a postobjectivistic and postpositivistic position. It is 
regarded as systemic and is characterized by a functional and a teleological 
interrelatedness, as well as an interdependence of dynamic entities 
incorporating a whole. Postmodern scientists regard themselves as 
"participants" instead of "spectators." A network of relationships is 
important, engaging all people and the whole person. This paper addresses 
how scholars, within this new paradigm, can become more like "wise" 
servants and less like masters of absolute, cognitive, and exclusive knowledge. 
Introduction: Post-modern or Postmodernism? 
Progressively more scholars believe that we are living in a post-modern 
age and that our traditional modernistic way of undemanding this world is 
coming to an end.' Murphy states that a dramatic change in " th ihng 
'Stephen Edelston Toulmin, i%e Return to Cosmology: Postmodem Science and the 
Theology of Nature (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 254; William E. Doll, A 
Post-modem Perspective on Cuwiculum (New York: Teachers College Press, 1993), 3. Stanley 
Grenz says that we experience a cultural shift that challenges the change frompremodemity 
to modernity (A Primer on Postmodernism [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 19961, 2). P. Cilliers 
states that a postmodern condition is not merely the result of willful acts by theorists, but 
is due to the complexities of the linguistic and social spaces ("Postmodern Knowledge and 
Complexity," Suzd-Affikaanse Tydskrifvir Wysbegeerte 14, no. 3 [1995]: 126). 
strategy" has occurred among Anglo-American intellectuals during the last half 
of the century. This can be described as a "paradigm" shift that has important 
implications for theology, in particular for conservative theologians that insist 
on God's special action in the world, as well as for the authority of the Bible.* 
If these statements are regarded as valid, it will challenge us, as scholars, with 
difficult, but also with creative and even radical, new opportunities. 
The title of this paper: "Beyond Modernism: Scholarship and 
'Servanthood,'" indicates a serious effort to move beyond r n ~ d ~ s r n . ~  By 
designating the title of this paper "Beyond Modernism," I indicate that I 
wish to differentiate between modernity and m~dernism.~ The concept of 
modernism represents a positivistic approach that is characterized by, 
inter a&, rationalism, empiricism, reductionism, and mechanism. 
Modernism means to make modernity into an absolute and final state of 
affairs. In view of the fact that my own vision is still being tinged by the 
modern worldview, I have not designated this paper as "beyond 
modernity" but rather "beyond modernism." By designating my position 
as "beyond modernism," I actually present a "post-modern" (with a 
hyphen to distinguish it) approach. Post-modernity should not, however, 
be equated with the concept of the postmodernism which changes post- 
modernity into an absolute and final notion.' My "post-modern" position 
could rather be placed within constructive post-modern thought than 
within deconstructive postmodernism.' This post-modern vision looks to 
'J. Wesley Robbins, "Murphy on Postmodernity, Science and Religion," Zygon 33 
(Summer 1998): 463-466. 
'For a critique on modernism, see R. A. Morrow and C. A. Rorres, Social Theory and 
Education: A Critique of Theories of Social and Cultural Reproduction (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1995), 409. 
'I am still bound to use the tools of modernity; I do not, however, wish to 
accommodate a "late modern" position. For a critique on late modernism see E. van Niekerk, 
"Postmodern Theology," in Faith, Theology and Post-modernity: Package 2 (Pretoria: 
University of South Africa, 1995), 1-21. 
5P. M. Rosenau states that post-modernists come in many shapes and sizes-upbeat post- 
modernists, despairing post-modernists and post-modernists who do not appreciate being 
called post-modernists. Whereas postmodernism is stimulating and fascinating, it finds itself 
at the same time on the brink of confusion ("Affirmatives and Sceptics," in The Truth about 
the Truth: De-confusing and Re-constructing the Postmodern World, ed. Walter Truett 
Anderson [New York: Putnam, 19951, 107). Van Niekerk states that although the term 
"postmodernism" has been used to describe many social tendencies and experiences, there are 
some recurring themes in the post-modern debate. Some of these are contingency, 
randomness, lateral networking versus hierarchical oppositions, multifacetedness, and a 
protest against progress (van Niekerk, 1). 
6J. Wentzel van Huyssteen states that Rosenau tentatively distinguishes between two 
streams of thought in the current post-modern debate: affirmative and skeptical 
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the past, and it transcends it in such a way that the new is built on the old. 
It will both accommodate and "stretch" the past and modernity. I have 
thus chosen to speak of a "post-modern" vision rather than of a "model" 
or even of an "approach." 
This paper will emphasize two important issues. First, a post-modern 
vision wishes to overcome the "conservative-liberal" discourse with its 
search for absolute and objective truths. Second, it will demonstrate that 
scholarship and "servanthood' can be more easily accommodated within 
a post-modern vision than within modernism. 
From Prernodernism to Modernism 
Premodernity looks at things in an organic way.' God was regarded as the 
center of the world and also of our understanding. Premodernity, however, 
was progressively replaced, to a large extent, by a positivistic view of science. 
While Plato and Aristotle separated ideas from objects, they at least still 
believed that these notions needed each other. Their thoughts nevertheless 
anticipated the foundation of modern positivistic science.' Scientists such as 
Copernicus (1473- 1 543), Kepler (1571- l63O), and in particular Galileo (1564- 
1642) closed the door of premodernity and opened the door to a new 
worldview. They insisted that the world has to be interpreted from a strictly 
quantitative point of view.9 
This position was strengthened by the ideas of Descartes (1596-1650). In 
postmodernity. On the one hand, skeptical postmodernism offers a pessimistic, negative, 
gloomy assessment, with a vagueness or even an absence of moral parameters. Affirmative 
postmodernists, on the other hand, have a more hopeful and optimistic view of the post- 
modern age. This affirmative kind of postmodernity is open to responsible normative choices 
("Should We Be Trying So Hard to be Post-modern? A Response to Drees, Haught, and 
Yeager," Zygon 32 [December 19971: 571). See also W. T. Anderson, "Four Different Ways 
to be Absolutely Right," in The Truth about the Truth, ed. Walter Truett Anderson (New 
York: Putnam's Sons, 1995), 112,113. Anderson places scholars such as Richard Rorty and 
Thomas Kuhn within a constructivist worldview. He designates the second group as those 
who are "post-modern players." Their position is more "an attitude" than an "intellectual 
position." The third group is that of the nihilists, who believe that since not all the 
conflicting beliefs can be true, they must all be false. 
'5. Degenaar maintains that the premodern k o u r s e  is characterized by the absence of a 
so-called critical approach. The premodern k o u r s e  is structured by the language of the 
community to which one belongs ("The Collapse of Unity, in N m  Models of Thinking on the 
Eve ofa N m  Century, ed. C. W. du Toit [Pretoria: University of South Africa Press, 1996],6). 
'Ibid., 20. Quantifying results became the central technique of the emerging positive 
scientific enterprise. Galileo believed that God used the alphabet of mathematics to write the 
laws of nature. 
his Discourse on Method he established the foundations of knowledge by 
presenting his beliefs vis-a-vis radical doubt. The certainty that remains in 
confronting doubt is that the thinking subject is doubting. Therefore the 
certainty of knowledge rests in the fact that the thinking self is the " f i  
truth" that doubt cannot deny, namely, I think; thert$ore l a m  (Cogzto ogo 
sum). He argues, "I  could receive it without scruple as the first principle of 
philosophy."10 This led to a new conception of the human person. Humans 
are "thinking substances" and "autonomous rational beings."ll Dgcartes, 
"rightly conducting reason for seeking truth," had faith in mental reflection, 
and an external order that is expressed in a manner that we can understand 
and accumulate accurate empirical observations. This enclosed a naive idealism 
in human abilities and in the one-to-one relationship between what we think 
reality is and reality itself.'* Descartes' four methodological rules for directing 
reason searching for truth made it clear that there is no dynamic relationship 
between fact and theory, practicality, and imagination. Whatever is true or 
factual is not "created" by the human mind but "dis~overed."'~ For Dexartes 
there was not only an external reality that was set up by a rational, 
"geometricaln God, but this reality was unaffected by our personal activities 
and prejudices. He even went further and separated reality into primary and 
secondary qualities. The primary qualities are those of position, size, shape, 
and motion, and they are objective and mathematical in nature.14 The 
secondary qualities are "things" such as color, odor, taste, texture, and sound, 
are less real and inferior to the primary. Personal feelings and intuitions are 
thus not a source of knowledge. Dexartes' subject-object dualism made nature 
and "thingsn "objects" to be manipulated by "reason."15 
For the next three hundred philosophers and theologians accepted 
'?Rent5 Descartes, Philosophical Works, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross 
(New York: Dover, 1955), 106. 
"Ignace de la Potterie, "History and Truth," in Problems and Perspectives of 
Fundumental 7%eology, ed. Rent5 Latourelle and Gerald O'Collins, trans. Matthew J. 
O'Connell (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 89. 
12Red Descartes stated: "[There are] certain laws which God has so established in 
nature . . . that after sufficient reflection we cannot doubt that they are exactly observed in 
all which exists or which happens in the worldn (Discourse on Method: Meditations on First 
Philosophy Principles of Philosophy [London: Dent, 1950],27). 
"Doll, 30-3 1. 
"De la Potterie, 89. For Descartes mathematical truth is the model of all truth. He 
limited the object of metaphysics to distinct and clear ideas. The objects of research must 
have the proofs of arithmetic and geometry. 
15Grenz states that the modern person "can appropriately be characterized as Descartes' 
autonomous, rational substance encountering Newton's mechanistic worldn (3). 
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the primacy of reason advocated by Descartes. His view that the truths of 
mathematics arise from the nature of reason itself and that they are more 
certain than knowledge which is derived from empirical observation paved 
the way for the ideal of "rationality" and "objective kn~wledge."'~ 
Newtonian mechanics led to the rejection of the organic view." Here 
- 
reality was reduced to basic mechanical elements: Every particle was "what it 
[was] apart from the other." These particles were regarded as autonomous 
units that together formed a machine. They were touching each other in a 
machine-like way, but they did not affect the inner nature of each other.18 
Armed with this "atomistic" model, modern science and technology attained 
great triumphs. From Newton's Principia Mathematics it was clear that the 
universe had a simple symmetry. Within this symmetry was a set of linear, 
causative relations accessible to exact mathematical description. The "natural" 
order of Newton's universe was both simple and observable.19 
Both Descartes and Newton sought to use the power of reason to 
enhance a theological agenda. People started to speak about this world 
from a quantitative approach rather than a qualitative approach. 
Rationalism became the accepted norm and replaced revelation and the 
perspective offaith." 
Modernistic Science 
Descartes' reasoning, "I think; therefore I am," Newton's mechanistic 
worldview (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosopby), the further 
developments during the Enlightenment, and the "success" of scientific 
research resulted in an unqualified confidence in scientific inquiry and the 
deification of specifically technical rationality. "Science" became a dogma 
instead of remaining just another discipline. It mastered the art of 
16Doll, 113,140. Pierre Laplace, Henri de Saint-Simon, and Auguste Comte had a vision 
of a new age-industrial and technocratic. Progress did not only seem possible it was regarded 
as inevitable. Philosophy and positivistic science had created their own rules in the game of 
knowledge and allowed only rationalistic knowledge, which consists of definitions. 
"Newton best constructed his concept of new cosmology in the final edition of his 
Phifosophiue naturalisprincipiu mathemdtica (Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 1972). 
"David Bohm, "Postmodern Science and a Postmodern World," in The Reenchantment 
of Science: Postmodern Proposals, ed. David Ray Griffin (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 1988), 60-62. 
'?Doll, 27. Philosophers such as Voltaire, who took Newtonian mechanics to France, 
proclaimed this science to be the "messiah" of the world. Doll maintains that the "dismissal 
of God as a working hypothesis, which Laplace did so easily, was but the final stop in the 
march from organicism to mechanism, from inherent essences to mathematical formulae." 
"control" so well that it was "mushrooming its methods into a metaphysic" 
and thus creating "~cientism."~~ Modern thought very soon adopted a 
mechanistic, atomistic, and positivistic perspective; this adoration of science 
led to its deification that reached its heyday in the early 1960~.~' Scientists 
- - 
were regarded as people who could produce exact and unambiguous 
knowledge. 
These developments were also influential in giving rise to the so-called 
"exact" sciences. These scientists assumed that they were dealing with "facts" 
and "objective" data. These so-called "exact" sciences also introduced 
themselves, to a large extent, as the ultimate solution. In the year that 
Charles Darwin published his Ongin of Species, Herbert Spencer asked and 
answered the question: What kind of knowledge is worth the most? His 
reply was "~cience."~' Science, and in particular positivistic science, became 
the foundation on which was built the modernist paradigm framed our 
intellectual, social, and theological thought. Reason was bound by and 
defined in terms of scientific technology." This modernist paradigm 
introduced an understanding of a social, psychological, and physical 
environment in which not only a positivistic science developed but also a 
generation of scientists who claimed absolute truths from an exclusive 
- 
stance.25 This modernistic approach determined our worldview, cognitive, 
methodology, and the nature of scholarship. Theology developed a 
methodology that accommodated the criteria of these "exact" sciences. 
UModern science accepted an epistemology and a methodology that were reductionistic. 
Psychology, and in particular Freud and many of his colleagues, proclaimed that human beings 
were determined by their biological composition. Classical Behaviorism regarded humans as 
determined by their social context, whereas Mamism believed that human beings were merely 
the product of their labor. Empiricism and the correspondmce view of truth led modern 
science to believe that truth can be determined in an absolute and comprehensive way. The 
theory of evolution was constructed and empowered by modernism's worldview. Modern 
science with its "successful" and persuasive technological development, empowered 
evolution: "Our world is progressively becoming better." 
"Herbert Spencer states: "for gaining a livelihood . . . Science, for parental functions . . . 
Science, for good citizenship . . . Science, for the enjoyment of art . . . Science, for the purpose 
of discipline . . . Science. Science . . . is the best preparation for all these orders of activityn 
(Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical [London: Williams & Norgate, 1929],84-85). 
24Doll maintains that "science of this Spencerian type-a modernist adaptation of Rene 
Descartes' rationalism and Isaac Newton's empiricism-has become for the social sciences, 
and hence for education and curriculum, a paradigm" (1). 
25Cilliers maintains that positivistic science shifted from verification to falsification, "If one 
cannot add to the grid, you could at least disquahfy unwanted members." He concludes that 
everything that was too complex or contained unpredictability was disregarded. "Subsequently, 
large parts of the totality of human knowledge are &regarded as unscientificn (128). 
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Theology became obsessed with finding exactly the right method and the 
irrefutable modern rational argument. 
David Tracy, however, states that "we are all, willingly or unwillingly, 
being forced to leave m~dernity."~~ 
Rationalism 
Modernism may, in thefirst instance, be "characterizedn by rationalism. 
Rationalism determined, to a large extent, the "naturen of theology and its 
reductionistic approach to truth?7 The enlightenment project was built on the 
epistemological assumption that the modern "mind" can obtain certain and 
absolute knowledge. It is believed that the discovery of more knowledge is 
always good and that progress in science will set us free from bondage.28 
After Descartes' knowledge was regarded as a separate and isolated 
notion, removed from the experiences and wisdom of life,29 truth became 
more and more defined with concepts, and revelation and faith were 
explained by way of  proposition^.'^ 
Whereas truth was at fxst separated from history,31 it later became, for 
26The above mentioned approach is being progressively challenged by scholars, such as 
Tracy, who states that we are all, willingly or unwillingly, being forced to leave modernity. 
David Tracy, "The Return of God in Contemporary Theology," in Why Theology? ed. 
Claude Geffri and Werner Jeanrond (London: SCM Press), 37. 
27Walter Truett Anderson argues that there are at least four distinguishable worldviews, 
each with its own language of public dscourse and epistemology: (1) the postmodern-ironist, 
who believes that truth is socially constructed; (2) the scientific rational, who finds truth through 
methodical and disciplined inquiry; (3) the social traditional rationalist, who maintains that truth 
is found in the heritage of the Western world; and (4) the neoromantic, who findstruth by being 
in harmony with nature and/or spiritual discovery of the inner self. Anderson maintains that 
the scientific-rational and the social-tradtional approaches are conservative worldviews that are 
holding on to the values of a modern world that is "beginning to look kind of shaky" ("Four 
Different Ways to be Absolutely Right," in The Truth about the Truth, 110-111). 
29De la Potterie further states that "Platonic idealism, with its strong metaphysical 
structure and its keen sense of transcendence of God, could not survive as such in the modern 
age that is so profoundly rationalistic and positivistic" (89). 
jOIbid., 90. De la Potterie notes that this was particularly noticeable in the way theologians 
spoke of truth. "Whereas Scripture and the older tradition always used aletheiu or in the 
singular and meant by the term the definite revelation Jesus has made, nineteenth-cennuy 
theology became increasingly accustomed to using the word in the plural and speaking of the 
truths of faith; such a practice meant a risk of absolutizing in formulas the revelation of God in 
Jesus Christ. The language used becomes abstract: 'Ineffable truths proposed by . . . divine 
revelation.'" 
"There is, however, something in common between the views of Plato and the 
Enlightenment, as they both isolate truth from history. De la Potterie says that "the result 
the modern mind, that which "passed the test of scimt$c veriication or [was] 
guaranteed by solid historical do~umentation."~~ According to the 
presuppositions of this approach, truth is found solely by scientific and 
historical research, and it cannot be found by faith?' Pure rational truth alone 
started to dominate the "confused and uncertain material of sense 
e~~erience."~' Researchers shifted their emphasis from making "good 
judgments" to making "accurate The Western world was 
characterized as a "triumph of the mind," the Cartesian mind. Thomas H. 
Groome maintains that this was a narrow epistemology in that it "demeaned 
the function of memory and imagination in knowing, and excluded the 
corporeal, the affective, the aesthetic, and the relati~nal."~~ 
Scholars' desire "to know" became degraded to a rabid quest for rational 
certainty and institutionalized reason." This quest for certainty was, however, 
mostly in the realm of zdeas and not in the sphere of ethics or behavior.38 
is, that here again, but in a quite different sense than in Platonism, Christ, whose divinity is 
now denied, ' . . . is radically cut off from history with its contingency and servitudes. He 
comes on the scene as a superman who brings truth that is valid at all times and outside of 
time. . . . Time and history are in principle completely neutral and irrelevant and set no 
conditions truth is universal'" (ibid., 90). 
j21bid. Historical truth became the only truth. Only facts that have been documented 
and controlled by all can be scientific and guarantee the objectivity of history. This 
understanding paved the way for critical-historical methods to give the real picture of the 
biblical text. De La Potterie states that these methods can discover only the external aspect 
of Christ's person; they are unaware of the mystery of his life and thus of his truth. 
331bid., 94-97. De la Potterie states that truth later became an existential experience 
under the influence of Max Stirner and Saren Kierkegaard. 
341bid., 89. According to de la Potterie, a similar position was held by Leibniz. 
Knowledge of truth has nothing to do with common experience. Pure reason deals only with 
truths independent of the senses. Philosophical presuppositions like this prepared the way 
for Lessing's axiom at the time of the Enlightenment: "Accidental truths of history can never 
become the proof of necessary truths of reason." 
36Thomas H. Groome maintains that the "enlightenment rationality, with its battle cry 
of 'dare to think' (Kant), has been turned against itself with a vengeance. So much of the 
critical literature of the post-Enlightenment era has been a devastating critique of its episternic 
paradigm-especially of its naive rationalism, exclusivity, individualism, feigned objectivity, 
and lack of recognition of its own politics and social interest" ("Religious Knowing: Still 
Looking for That Tree," Religzous Education 92 [1997]: 207,208). 
"John D. Caputo asks the question: "Do we not require both?" referring to rational certainty 
and an openness to other aspects of life. He concludes that we need an undecidable fluctuation 
between institutional and noninstitutional reasoning (Radiurl Hermeneutics: Rtpetition, 
Derons~ruction, and the Hermeneutic Project @3loomington: Indiana University Press, 1984,229). 
"Ferdinand E. Deist states that "African" thinking does not give "priority to the idea, 
"Common-sense" wisdom was disrmssed, and the only knowledge regarded as 
valid was "scientificn knowledge.39 John D. Caputo states that to a great extent 
reason soon came to mean a kind of logic that supports systems of power 
which are currently in place, whereas irrationality becomes that which is 
without power." Kant's "pure reason" and the "autonomy of reason" thus 
need to be regarded as a dangerous abstraction, "for reason is always already 
embedded in systems of power."41 
According to Ernst M. Conradie, "post-reformed" theology 
progressively emphasized the cognitive element of faith." With such an 
emphasis on knowledge in theology, theology becomes lmowledgeabaut God 
and not knowledge of God. Scripture is regarded as a compilation of eternal 
and rationalistic truths about God in the Newtonian mechanistic sense of the 
word. Within thls approach theology is assigned the task of formulating truths 
in an absolutely meticulous and accurate way. This, however, is often done 
within an ahistorial context. Theology then falls prey to intellectualism, 
losing its dynamic moment as a contemporary event. 
A post-modern vision questions the rationalistic reading of the Bible that 
assumed that the texts of the Bible were provided by a pure valuefree 
rationalism. Rationalism enables us, for example, to either a low 
view or a high view of Scripture. It does not, in a reflexive way, take serious 
cognizance that our view of Scripture is predetermined by our 
presuppositions. ?%us our view of Scripture is, without any interrogation, 
regarded as the biblical view of Scripture. With the assistance of some or other 
rationalistic and mechanistic tools we eliminate all the "noises." A post- 
modern vision sees a rationalistic reading of the Bible as a reductionistic 
reading that deprives the Bible of its dynamic story of God's salvation and 
liberation." Thus rationalism reduces the Bible to an "object." 
but to action, not to theory but to practice. Thus an idea cannot be right or wrong in 
principle or in abstracto. It can only be judged once the idea has materialized in a deed, and 
the deed can only be called right if its outcome is beneficialn ("South-Africanising Biblical 
Studies: An Epistemological and Hermeneutical Inquiry," Scriptura 37 [I9911 : 38). 
39See also Petrus Secundus Dreyer, "Die fdosofie van Imrnanuel Kant en Protestants- 
teologiese Denkstrukture," H m r m d e  Teologiese Studies 46 (1990): 589, 592. According to 
Dreyer, Kant stated that miracles have to be explainable in a rational way; otherwise they cannot 
be accepted as miracles. He says that Kant changed the Christian religion into a rationalistic 
philosophical system. 
T a p u t o  states that "it is of the essence of the power which institutionalised reason 
exerts that it is able to define what is out of power as 'irrational'" (229). 
42Ernst M. Conradie, "Modelle van teologie as handeling," Scriptura 36 (1990): 15. 
4'In the light of van Peursen's statement that "the most important change in recent 
Our senses can no longer be divided in an atomistic way. Modernistic 
scholars often divorce the will from feelings, thinking that Christian people 
should be "rational" people. Reason alone cannot guide value judgments in an 
adequate way. Jeff Astley says reason is blind in this area.44 Reason divorced 
from emotions is no longer human and thus no longer reasonable." Whereas 
we need to "reasonn about our emotions, reason cannot and must not replace 
affective and conative modes. Rationality has to be related to cultural, social, 
and psychological contexts. If it is not, one's own reductionistic context will 
determine the nature of one's scholarship. Rationality cannot merely consist 
in intellectual and cognitive consistency, nor be the "fact finding instrument" 
that David Hume took it to be. 
A Search for Objectivity and Absolute Truth 
A second important aspect of modernism, and in particular rationalism, 
is its search for absolute and objective truths.& Descartes' Cogito ergo sum set 
philosophy is that 'Rationality' does not function any more as an absolute standard," one may 
assume that there are no absolute or final rationalistic standards accordmg to which the Bible can 
be read. See C. A. van Peursen, ^Ratio and imaginatio," South Afican Journal of Philosophy 10, 
no. 3 : 64. It is not, however, suggested that theology can employ an esoteric method. The 
concept "esoteric" means a method that employs statements of faith that cannot be questioned 
and further discussed in a theological debate. Thielicke cites: "Die nova oboedentia gibt der 
Vernuft die Freiheit gegenuber den unwissendvon ihr getragenen Diktaturen." See Johan Andre 
Wolfaardt, Kerklike konfiontasie oorde (Groningen: VRB Offsetdrukkerij, 1971), 63. 
44 Jeff Astley argues that sometimes we are at our most Christian "when we do love 'too 
well,' against all reason and 'despite the evidence.'" Astley concludes that "despite the risk 
we run of having emotions, including the risk of these emotions being or becoming 
irrational, we would not be human without them" (The Philosophy of Christian Religzous 
Education [Birmingham, AL: Religious Education Press, 19941,228). 
451bid., 232. Astley argues that we should reject the personification of "Reason" as an 
opponent to "Feeling." They are both aspects of our motives. 
V a n  Niekerk argues that "from the medieval period until the 17"h century the main 
experiential ideas of subiectum and obiectum went through an interesting process. Subiectum 
in that period had to be understood as the topical object of a person's 'thinking and action' 
and should not be seen as a passive object in the modern sense of the word. . . . Later the 
notion of an object became the standard designation for subiectum." ("Inaugural Lecture," 
14). Grenz argues that the Enlightenment project had the assumption that the modern 
"mind" can determine knowledge in a certain and objective way (4). Tutorial Letter 103/1988 
(Biblical Studies, BSA 302-3) : 32, 34, states that fundamentalists "maintain that there is such 
a thing as 'objective truth' and that it is possible to establish it." According to this letter, one 
of the founders of fundamentalism was Charles H. Hodge, who argued that there is a great 
distinction between theories and facts. Theories are human constructions and subjective. 
Facts are of divine origin and thus objective. There is, thus, a clear "distinction between 
objective and subjective knowledge." The latter is associated with "theories, feelings, 
experience, practical or superficial knowledge; objective knowledge, on the other hand, rests 
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a process in motion that created an "objective" world." Richard Rorty 
maintains that the Western culture has centered itself around this notion of 
the search for truth and the desire for objectivity. He argues that this tradition 
ran from the Greek philosophers through the Enlightenment. It has, however, 
turned away from solidarity to objectivity." With the emerging of the view 
of the "mind-asinner-space," science was distracted from the search for 
wisdom to the quest for knowledge or rationality seen in terms of a correct 
representation.49 Tracy describes this modernist view of science as follows: It 
"found its apex in the positivistic view of science: here, objective, true 
scientific knowledge is grounded in empirical facts that are uninterpreted, 
indubitable, and fixed in meaning theories derived from these facts by 
induction or deduction are accepted or rejected solely on their ability to 
survive objective experimentation; finally, science progresses by the gradual 
accumulation of facts."50 
Scholars demanding "objectivity" in their research can be associated with 
a generalized method used in the natural sciences. Van Niekerk states that the 
British philosopher Alfred Ayer, in Lungmge, Truth and Logic, adopted this 
method: To be scientific meant conforming to the natural sciences. Judged by 
this criterion, ethics and theology are emotive theories and not scientific. 
Modernistic scientists saw themselves as researchers who produced exact and 
unambiguous knowledge, and established absolute truths. The absolute 
abstraction and reduction of human nature is an example of this kind of 
reasoning and an important characterization of m~dernism.~' 
Post-modern scholars maintain that the highest ideal for modernistic 
academics, namely to be objective, is created by default. Being influenced 
by the Cartesian understanding of objectivity, they have confused this so- 
on facts, proof, logic and reason." See also A Megill, ed., Rethinking Objectivity (Durham, 
'NC: Duke University Press). This collection presents two kinds of attacks on the old 
meaning of objectivity: (1) Objectivity has been used and is being used as a cover by the 
powerful, who are imposing their interest on others; (2) objectivity needs to be redefined in 
terms of intersubjectivity. 
"Van Niekerk, "Inaugural Lecture," 5. 
48Ri~hardRorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity," in From Modernism to Postmodemism, ed. 
Lawrence E. Cahoone (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 573-588. 
49J. G. Allen, "Rationality, Relativism, and Rorty," Sud-Afikuunse Tydskrif vir 
Wysbegeerte 11, no. 3 (1992): 53. 
%avid Tracey, cited in Van Huyssteen, 569. 
51Modernism described the "absolute subject" as one who "thinks therefore he is"; 
"produces therefore she is"; "I have a certain gender"; or "I have a certain pigmentation," 
therefore I am. In this regard see van Niekerk, "Postmodern Theology," 5. 
called objectivity with relative consensus about matters.52 This is done not 
only by supplying so-called proofs from the Bible or from "suitable" 
empirical research, but also by what Jacques Derrida would designate as 
"logocentrism."53 Scholars try to bypass the figurative "nature" of language 
and are "longing for presence," hoping to find a privileged position 
outside language. This will ensure them a position of fixed meanings and 
a view of reason as a universal norm of understanding." 
Consmt ive  and Liberal Presuppositions: An Objective 
And Absolute Reading of the Biblical Text? 
Both "confessional" (conservative) and "liberal" scholars, sailing in the 
same modernistic boat, are seeking for an objective reading of the biblical 
rexP by adhering to the modernistic communication paradigm, which at 
times makes "religious dialogue . . . often little more than a contest to 
demonstrate 'We're right.'"" Tracy maintains that when there is a 
problem of correlating theos and logos, theology becomes obsessed with 
finding exactly the "right method" and the "irrefutable modern rational 
argument" for understanding and even perhaps for controlling God.' 
Confessional scholars, on the one hand, often protest against any 
information that does not suit their starus quo; on the other hand, they are in 
accordance with the basic points of departure of the modernistic paradigm. 
Fundamentalists, with an irrational rationality and an ad hoc incorporation of 
a metaphysics of understanding the guidance of the Holy Spirit, the verbal 
52Rorty states that "such institutional backups for beliefs take the form of bureaucrats 
and policemen, not of 'rules of language' and 'criteria of rationality'" (579). 
'See J. Degenaar, "Deconstruction-The Celebration of Language," in The Reader and 
Beyond, ed. B. Lategan (Pretoria: HSRC Press, 1992), 196. 
55Rorty maintains that "we are the heirs of thls objectivist tradition, which centers 
around the assumption that we must step outside our community long enough to examine 
it in the light of something which transcends it, namely, that which it has in common with 
every other actual and possible human community" (574-575). Van Niekerk states: "Modern 
literary criticism, historical criticism and fundamentalist reading of 'sacred' texts like the 
Bible all sail in the same boat" ("Postmodern Theology," 8). See also Nancey Murphy, 
"Postmodern Non-relativism: Imre Lakatos, Theo Meyering, and Alasdair MacIntyre," The 
Philosophical Forum 27, no. 1 (1995): 30. However, before the reader objects to this 
categorizing of modernistic theologians, I hasten to point out that whereas many modernistic 
scholars can be characterized by these positions, others have reacted against them, but in 
ways that share many of the presuppositions of their modernistic times. 
%C. Mechert, "Pluralistic Education in a Postmodern World," Religious Education 90 
(1995): 346. 
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inspiration of the Bible, and with such tools as the grammatical-historical 
method, or the dicta probantiu method, believe that the Bible per se supplies 
them with "proofs" and absolute "biblical" statements. 
"Liberaln scholars, on the other hand, most often accommodate the 
so-called scientific approach and use "scientific"too1s and positivistic 
methods, such as the historical-critical method to interpret the Scriptures 
and to determine what the Bible "really says.n58 
A post-modern vision takes serious cognizance of Jiirgen Habermas' 
point of view that all knowledge is motivated and mediated by "human 
intere~ts."'~ Even the knowledge of the natural sciences reflects the interests 
and voices that are controlled by the production of such knowledge.60 
According to Habermas, the statement "Science has proven," which is 
expected to end al l  argument, should be answered by the question, "From 
whose perspective and to serve what interest?*' "Scientific explanations and 
concepts are provisional human constructs organizing the natural world; they 
are not independent of human intellectual capacities, social interactions, and 
contingencies of history."6Z Post-modernists believe that many of the 
problems of communication with people and the biblical text come because 
of the lack of a reflexive approach in theology and thus a failure to take 
serious cognizance of the role of our "worldviews" and presuppositions.63 
58Edgar V. McKnight states that "the historical-critical 'reduction' of the text is fully 
satisfying within a world-view which sees meaning in terms of a temporal origin and 
historical cause-and-effect" ("Can We Make Sense in the Aftermath of Reception Theory?" 
in The Reader and Beyond: Theory and Practice in South A h n  Reception Studies, ed. Bernard 
C. Lategan (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992), 269). 
'?For a discussion of Habermas's views on objectivity, see M. Hesse, "Science and 
Objectivity," in Habermus: Critical Debates, ed. J. B. Thompson and D. Held, 98-115. 
Wall, 60. According to Doll the holocasut of two world wars has shattered the sweet 
dreams of reason for a more just and moral society. 
"Van Niekerk says that Habermas, in Erkenntnis und Interresse, identified three 
knowledgeproducing interests: "(i) An interest in control, associated with a positivist self- 
understanding of the sciences and with the world of work; (ii) an interest in understanding, 
associated with the hermeneutical sciences and cultural processes; (iii) and an interest in 
emancipation, associated with the critical sciences and progressive social evolution" (Xritical 
Theory in the 2 0 ~  Centuryn (1996],4). See also Groome, 209: "Though there can be an 
emanicipatory interest to our knowing, and much of Habermas' work is about making such 
interest intentional and self reflective, yet the technical and social sciences are driven by the 
interest of production, control, and maintenance of the status quo." 
@Willem B. Drees, "Naturalisms and Religion," Zygon 32 (1996): 526. 
63Albert Wolters, "Dutch Neo-Calvinism: Worldview, Philosophy and Rationality," in 
Rationality in the Chlvinian tradition, ed. Hendrik Hart, Johan van der Hoeven, and 
Nicholas Wolterstorff (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983), 115. See also 
Ferdinand Deist, "Bybelinterpretasie en ideologiekritiek: 'n Hermeneutiese oefening," 
Challenging absolute and objective points of view, does not assume 
that there are no "absolutes," as some postmodernists believe, but does 
challenge pretentious scholars maintaining a "God's eye view."64 No 
human or "tool" can abstract the contents of the Bible in pure form." To 
let the Bible as interpreted by us be a most important pointer to God's 
Word, God's Action, or God's Love, scholars need to be servants of this 
Word, this Action, this Story and this Love, acknowledging that their 
individual understanding of "realitynand the Bible's message is "pictured" 
in terms of their own thought categories.' Not only by interpreting or 
reinterpreting the Bible do scholars disturb its "content," but by the mere 
act of "observing" the Bible and putting it in a specific context, they 
disturb its ~ontent.~'  By assuming that they read the Bible in an absolute 
objective way, scholars are not uplifting but rather minimizing, to say the 
least, the message of the Bible." The post-modernist view contends that 
traditional individualistic "objectivistic" epistemology "ignores the 
intentionality and expressivity of human action and the entire complex 
process of intersubjective negotiation of meanings. In short, it disguises as 
Theologia Evangelica 15, no. 2 (1982): 8,lO. Modernistic scholars need to be confronted with 
Deist's statement, that this approach of surrendering all presuppositions to the text of the 
Bible cannot be taken. We cannot make any observation if we do not have a frame of 
reference. Mannheim's statement is thus important: It is not only my enemies' knowledge 
that tends to be ideological-but all knowledge is socially (and I may add, also culturally) 
determined and hence ideologically tinged. 
65Tutorial Letter 103/1988 : 63, reads that the grammatical-historical exegetical method 
reflected the influence of Scottish Common Sense Realism (see also Mark Ellingsen, 
"Common Sense Realism: The Cutting Edge of Evangelical Identity," Dialog 24 (1985) :199- 
200). For Reid, who developed Common Sense Realism, objective, nonperspectival 
observation of a phenomenon is possible. He states that the Scottish Common Sense Realism 
can be described in relation to three main emphases: (1) Epistemological Common 
Sense-this is the idea that our perceptions reveal the world very much as it is, (2) Ethical 
Common Sense, and (3) Methodological Common Sense. The problem that confronts this 
method is that the "historical" or doctrinal element often determines the meaning of a word. 
"Ibid., 35. Deist states: "The mere act of reading the Bible thus disturbs the Bible itself. 
Therefore there cannot be something like the eternal, unchanging and certain message of the 
Bible. To state the message of the Bible means to have conceptualised it first. Conceptualising 
implies a process of conception (from the father [the Bible] and a mother [the readerD which 
leads to the birth of a third 'personality,' different from the father and the mother." 
68Martin Weber illustrates something of the predicament of the conservative churches. 
Modernistic scholars believe that there is only one correct position (Who's Got the Truth? 
Making Sense out of Five Dtferent Adventist Gospels [Silver Spring, MD: Home Study 
International Press, 19943. 
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given a world which has to be continually intqreted."" 
Binary Oppositions Dictate the 
"Reading" of the Biblical Ta t  
Whereas opposing distinctions are not modern inventions, 
modernism reduced the possibility of differentiation by constructing 
closed binary oppositions.70 Western theological tradition became very 
much constructed on a polar or dyadic foundation: "Christian theology 
is repeatedly inscribed in binary terms."" Modernism does not regard 
these opposites as equal. These binary oppositions represent a firmly 
hierarchical two-tier structure, "with one of them-the surface-securely 
on top, and its deep counterpart as surely in place as the real foundation 
of what is expressed on the ~urface."'~ In this regard the "husk-kernel" or 
"form-content" opposition does not only demonstrate such a search for 
an objectivistic and a universalistic content of the Bible, but it may also 
represent a paternalistic attitude.') The danger is that in a very subtle way 
scholars may become imperialistic dictators." Scholars, particularly those 
from a position of power, always designate and dictate the "core" of the 
message, whereas others may decide on the "form" and the "husk."" This 
69G. M. Esland, "Teaching and Learning as the Organization of Knowledge," in 
Knowledge and Control, ed. M.F.D. Young (tondon: Collier-Macrnillan, 1971), 75. 
70Van Niekerk, "Postmodern Theology," 6. 
71Mark C. Taylor, "Erring: A Postmodern A/theologyYn in From Modernism to 
Postmodernism: An Anthology, ed. Lawrence E. Cahoone (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1996), 516. 
72Van Niekerk states that this modern "two-tier philosophical scheme also functions as 
the hyphenated inside-outside of human beings and things (mainly since Descartes)." 
According to Van Niekerk, postmodernity "seriously questions the modern hierarchical 
relationship, in which the 'surface' of thought or perception is causally linked with the 
'depth, meta-, foundational or basic' dimension. In the postmodern differentiation spectrum 
the modern binary dialectic of essence (depth) and appearance (surface) becomes two or more 
adjacent surfaces." He concludes: " Should we not scrutinize in each case the constructed 
experiential continuum that articulates the oppositional points or limiting values of modern 
societies and accordingly defer any attempt to master the continuum from either structural 
term?" ("Postmodern Theology," 2). 
"Van Niekerk argues that one of modernism's tools is the reduction of things to one 
basic explanatory "essence" ("Postmodern Theology," 1). 
74Van Niekerk argues that the modernistic binary oppositions brought forth a reduaionktic 
tendency, which in turn brought forth the "valwsmit~1 prioritisation of two opposing values as 
the b a l l  and end-all of any episodic ontologyn (Tostmodern Theology," 34). 
75Whereas some conservative scholars want to force even their cultural forms onto 
other cultures, others speak of the adoption of "biblical absolutesn into culture. They are 
approach can be taken to indicate that the 'core" represents a "pure 
gospel," which does not really have any implications for the shape of 
social or cultural life. Max L. Stackhouse came to the conclusion that this 
division obscures the fact that "various versions of the 'pure gospel' are 
more contextually influenced than their advocates recognize." He notes 
how critics of ethnocentrism, sexism, racism, and colonialism as seen in 
Christianity have often pointed out that what has been propagated in the 
name of the "pure gospel" seems to correspond to the prejudices of the 
time, gender, race, and geographical and social location of those who 
spoke in such spirited terms about the 'pure gospel."76 
A N m  Approch to Science and 7heoZog-y 
In philosophy, literature, natural sciences, quantum physics, and 
recently in theology, new voices are being heard. A paradigm has 
developed that has adopted a postobjectivistic and postpositivistic position 
and which demands a new approach to metaphysics, epistemology, and 
cosmology." Science, in particular quantum physics, has moved beyond 
Newtonian mechanics and atomism, Cartesian rationalism, and the 
subject-object bifurcation." Descartes' subject-object dichotomy has been 
aware of the temptation to proclaun the message in another culture without clothing it in 
the cultural garb of the people. They still believe, however, that there are biblical absolutes 
for all cultures and ages and that these must be proclaimed. Essential truths are being 
demarcated by using the kernel and husk (or content and form) approach. Even some more 
progressive theologians seem to adopt this approach: The church is being warned to 
distinguish between form and essence, shadow, and substance. Without denying that there 
may be such biblical absolutes, I would contend that we have not yet fully determined what 
these absolutes are. From within a different culture we may question these absolutes. Are 
they absolutes in Western clothing? Should other cultures also have the right to discuss the 
absoluteness of these biblical absolutes? 
7 6 M a ~  L. Stackhouse, "Contsrmalization and Theological Education," Theologzcal 
hkat ion 23 (1986): 71-72. Stackhouse contends that, since the E-tenment, many attempts 
have been made to identify the "essencen of Christianity and to distinguish this from "the 
'accidents' of social, cultural, linguistic, and historical context." According to Stackhouse, this 
kernel and husk, (or content and form) approach suggests that there is an ecumenical, orthodox, 
and context-invariant core to the Christian faith. This core has the potential to enter "into, 
refine, affirm, and give normative g;llldance to a l l  sorts of 'accidental' contexts around the globe." 
Stackhouse concludes that these distinctions are too sharp. 
nDoll states that the linear, sequential, and easily quantifiable ordering system that 
dominates education today is giving way to a more complex system of network that is more 
pluralistic in nature (3). 
*J. Mouton, A. G. van Aarde, and W. S. Vorster, Paradigms and Progress in neology 
(Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1988), 226. Lines said: "The classical science 
worldview was mechanistic in analogy, reductionistic in method, disciplinary in research, 
replaced by a subject-subject networking approach, and atomism by an 
interrelatedness of things.79 
Postmodernism has, in spite of its new forms of reductionism, opened 
up some important issues that cannot be too easily ignored by theology. 
Instead of rationality, the importance of language and its deconstruction has 
been introduced." The seeking of knowledge and the search for so-called 
truth do not exclude the politics of power. Instead of seeking "objective" 
truths, post-modernists are challenged to cooperate in constructing, in an 
episodic way, dynamic intersubjective moments of faith. 
From Atomism to Wholism and Networking81 
Newtonian mechanics introduced an atomistic worldview. Toulmin 
states, "from the time of the Renaissance on . . . the chief intellectual 
instrument-and virtue-of scientific work was, precisely, its single- 
minded preoccupation with the specific, narrowly defined questions 
proper to particular scientific disciplines."'* This modernistic 
reductionism has, particularly, given a privileged position to the mind. 
In contrast with modernism, post-modernity has a thirst for a renewal 
of the sense of the whole.83 Humans "know" the world to some extent, but 
deterministic in outlook, static in perception, entropic in direction, dualistic in practice, and 
positivistic in determination of truth." According to the theory of relativity, the Newtonian 
instruments of measure, such as mass and length, are relative to a particular observer. They 
may be altered by one's frame of reference and are thus not absolutely quantifiable. Nancey 
Murphy states that whereas modernism was characterized by a foundationahm in 
epistemology, referentialism in philosophy, and atomism in metaphysics, postmodern 
philosophy is characterized by wholism, a use of language instead of reference and 
antireductionism ("Postmodern Non-relativism: Imre Lakatos, Theo Meyering, and Alasdair 
MacIntyre," 7%e Philosophical Forum 27 no. 1 (1995), 38-40). 
79Doll,29. Newton believed that individual atoms form the ultimate "building blocksn 
of nature. These autonomous units touch each other in a mechanistic way, but each operates 
independently. 
?For a ddferentiated critique on postmodernism see J. D. Caputo, Against Ethics: 
Contributions to a Poetics of Obligations with Constant R.ference to Deconstruction 
(Bloornington: Indiana University Press, 1993). 
"Networking aspires to make progress beyond a holistic approach. Although certain 
properties are not denied by networking, it rather emphasizes the so-called "lines-of-flight," 
crisscrossing the properties. See in this regard D.P. Goosen, "Interdisciplinary Studies: An 
Apology for Nomadism," lecture given at the meeting of the Faculty of Theology and 
Science of Religion, 30 August, 1995,l. 
"Ted Peters, "David Bohm, Postmodernism, and the Divine," Zygon 20 (1985): 193. 
According to Peters, Bohm's thirst for wholeness is founded upon the reason that in the 
they know it through feelings and mrivings, as well as through sense 
impressions and thinking. This would mean that the scholar consists of the 
whole human being "where the cognitive, volitional and affective intera~t."'~ 
The affective, cognitive, aesthetic, the personal and social, the spiritual and the 
ethcal, human corporeality and sexuality, memory, and imagination, yes, 
every aspect should be valued as a source of knowing and wisdom. 
these lines, P. Cilliers argues that the self needs to be understood from the 
perspective of a "'fabric' of relations, a node in a network." We are not 
atomistic units standing for ourselves or by ourselves; neither can we throw 
away everything that does not fit into our reductionistic scheme.85 
The network of relationships is important to the post-modernist for at 
least two reasons: First, scholars should take note, in a reflexive way, of all 
exclusions and the overabundance of "oppressions at work in the 
production of knowledge" and should without constraint be committed to 
real "democracy in the production of knowledge."" The "subject" (scholar, 
researcher) does not manipulate the "object," but the community of 
knowers and searchers are marked by conversation, dialogue, and reflexive 
thinking. Instead of an "objective-subjective" position, post-modernists urge 
a relational position. "The relational aspect is not only among the knowers 
but also between the knower and the known. Instead of the subject standng 
'over against' to 'master' the object by knowing it through non-engaged 
objectivity, there needs to be a relationship between them that brings both 
knower and known to question each other."l" Second, post-modernists 
contend that scholars cannot be engaged in theological thinking in isolation, 
analyzing something objectively. Whole people, not only from every 
nation, tribe, and language, but also from every discipline and status, need 
to communicate and reflect in a reflexive way. 
In this regard, Habermas, with his "ideal speech situation," argues that 
our community and "life-world" have been overwhelmed by the "steering 
media" of money and power.88 Technical rationality (Zweckrational) must 
world of Newton and Descartes there is a fragmentation, a void of wholistic thinking. Grenz 
states that postmodernity's emphasis on holism is related to the rejection of the assumption 
of the Enlightenment, namely, that truth is certain and purely rational. It refuses to limit 
truth to its rational dimension (7). 
"Jiirgen Habermas's The&ry of Communicative Action, with its more than 800 pages 
of serious philosophical reading, has made a sigdcant contribution toward the theory of 
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be counterposed to practical rationality (reaching understanding) and 
emancipatory rationality (self-reflection and emancipation from 
oppression by systems). Communicative action must be differentiated 
from technological rationality, from the types of social action and 
nonsocial action that are oriented to "success" and to the achievement of 
ends and goals. For Habermas, understanding (Vmtiindigungj is to bring 
about an agreement (Einverstiindnis) that leads to a reciprocal 
understanding, shared knowledge, and mutual trust. The ultimate 
objective of this is to come to an understanding with another person.89 
Scholars can no longer be entangled by a monological perspective of the 
philosophy of the subject. Rather, post-modernists view the speaker and 
hearer as participating in a mutual reciprocal relationship, with 
communicative action being intrinsically dialogical. Habermas thus 
wanted to overcome the bifurcation between sender and receiver. 
Rationality is not achieved from a transcendental perspective, but is 
practically constituted by ~eop le  ngaged in communication free from 
constraint and coercion. To resolve a breakdown in communication, one 
moves to a level of discourse and argumentation where they, through the 
"force of the better argument, reach a consen~us."~ A conversation that 
can be regarded as "unlimited" is designated by Habermas as an ideal 
speech situation in which people are, in principle, able to participate 
communication (2 vols., trans. Thomas McCarthy [Boston: Beacon, 19841987l. Habermas 
argues that the Edghtenment project, and in particular the idea of universal morality and 
critical reason, has provided important gains. We cannot abandon them, but need to dedicate 
ourselves to a "radical enlightenment." The enlightenment is incomplete, but not "dead." 
Mumby believes that in Habermas the modernist project is once again linked with an 
emancipatory logic (D. K. Mumby, "Modernism, Postmodernism, and Communication Studies: 
A Rereading of an Ongoing Debate," Communication Theory7 [199q: 10). Strauss contends that 
the freedom of intellectual emancipation needs to be extended to all spheres of life. Modernity 
has colonized the lifeworld by the system and has thus failed to radicalize the emancipation of 
the Enlightenment. Through his critique of the Cartesian legacy and the reconstruction of social 
theory, Habermas developed a linguistic model of communicative understanding. Habermas's 
philosophy culminates ultimately in his analyses of communicative action (D.F.M. Strauss, "'n 
Wysgerige perspektief op die twintigste eeu teen die agtergrond van die voorafgaande 
eeuwendinge," Tyakkrilvir Chtelike Wetenskap 30 [I9941 : 12). Werstehen ist kommunikative 
Erfahrung" for Habermas (Jiirgen Habermas, Erkenntnis and Interesse Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 19701, 227). He believes that his theory of communicative action can win back the 
control of the "lifeworld." Terrence W. Tilley, "Toward a Theology of the Practice of 
Communicative Action," in Postmodma Theologies: 7$e Challenge of Religious D imi t y ,  ed. 
Terrence W. Tilley (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1995), 9. 
89For a critique of consensus see N. Rescher, Pluralism: Against the Demand for 
Consensus (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993). 
V. Duvenage, "Die kritiese teorie as 'n filosofiese perspektief op die twintigste eeu," 
Tydskrifvir Christelike Wetenskap 30 (1994) : 49. 
without d~mination.~' In resolving disputes, even the better argument 
must be open to a rational debate. One can conclude that Habermas is 
defending a strong "cognitivist" position. His "ideal speech situation," 
however, may be, at the most, regarded as a late modern approach still 
following the "conduit metaphor." This conduit metaphor eliminates all 
"noisesn-and regards them as disturbances that distort communication 
- 
between person and person or between text and person.92 
From a neopragmatist perspective, Rorty argues that foundationalism 
conceptions of rationality destroy con~ersation.~' According to him, 
foundationalism imposes restrictions on reason and forces it to an end." 
The notion of contingency is important as it sustains and encourages 
conversation. Conversation is characterized by an absence of issues, such 
as fixed goals, lists of acceptable topics, hierarchies of membership. In our 
conversation different "universes" of communication meet. The plurality 
of voices and the practices they represent need to be protected against all 
attempts of "closure."95 Foundationalism seriously inhibits such a 
conversation and thus retards thought, "which is always set in motion by 
the encounter with strangeness."96 A serious problem is Rorty's refusal 
to introduce any external values and criteria within this discourse. 
Modern discourse, according to Jean-Francois Lyotard, has made itself 
legitimate by appealing to a coherent metanarrative that performed a 
general unifying function. Postmodernism rather wishes to introduce a 
multiplicity of discourses and many "language games." They are not 
externally legitimate but rather locally justified. Lyotard argues for 
smaller and more numerous stories that function well within their own 
contexts. In this regard Cilliers accuses, by implication, conservative 
"Van Niekerk states that Habermas's conduit metaphor is a "sealed communicative 
pipeline from person to person or a multiplicity of individual pipelines between this person 
and the next one." According to the conduit metaphor of reading, a text must have the "least 
intrusions, distortions, interferences and misprints to 'prove' that it is the purest and thus the 
correct interpretation." This conduit metaphor is still based on the Claude Shannon 
information theory ("Postmodern Theology," 8,9). 
"M. Peters, "Techno-science, Rationality, and the University: Lyotard on the 
'Postmodern Condition,'" Educutional Theory 39 (1989): 97,99. According to Peters, Rorty 
argues for a position termed "epistemological behaviorism." It explains what society allows 
us to say, rather than what we say. 
"Allen, 54. 
96See Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1980), 9; Allen, 54. 
BEYOND MODERNISM: SCHOLARSHIP AND "SERVANTHOOD" 97 
theologies, which have developed a nostalgia for grand metanarratives that 
unify. This is a dream of Western metaphysics that experiences the 
postmodern condition as fragmented, characterized by anarchy, and thus 
meaningless. This is not a relativizing of knowledge, not an "anything-goes" 
sit~ation.~' Lyotard's "connectionist" model is not based on Newtonian 
atomism, but the self is understood in terms of a "fabric of relationships," 
a "node in a network." Everyone is always involved through a network of 
relations with others, this has importance for and influence on the total 
cGscourse. 
Modernistic discourses, and even some postmodernistic discourses, 
focus onesidedly on communication as a rational and logical discourse. A 
post-modern vision seeks both to communicate (rationally) and to have 
believing, affecting, and imagining aspects which encounter each other's 
stories as well as God's Story. 
The Post-modern Scientist: A Partict@anP8 
R. Sassower claims that modern scientists have viewed themselves as 
"spectators," whereas post-modern scientists regard themselves as 
"participants" in the study of this world.% From the year 1600 onward 
science and philosophy pursued "'rational objectivity' of a kind that could 
be arrived at only by a detached and reflective observer."'@' Thus for Pierre 
Simon, Marquis de Laplace, the scientist must observe, analyze, describe, 
and comment on phenomena ("objects!") without being drawn into them. 
The human mind must observe the world, but always from outside. This 
encouraged a particular psychological attitude, the investigation of 
specialized science from a detached viewpoint. It has been "natural" for 
the scientist to work from a psychological distance. In describing the 
modernistic scientist, Toulmin states, "Too much emotional involvement 
with his subject matter will not do the investigator's scientific work good: 
98Grenz states: "In rejecting the modern assumption of the objectivity of knowledge 
postmoderns also reject the Enlightenment ideal of the dispassionate, autonomous knower. 
. . . The postmodern worldview operates with a community-based understanding of truth" 
(8). Rorty maintains that Plato developed the idea of the intellectual, who is one, and is in 
touch in an immediate way with the nature of things. This produces the idea that rational 
inquiry should "make visible a realm to which non-intellectuals have little access" ("Solidarity 
or Objectivity," 574). 
991. Sassower, "Postmodernism and Philosophy of Science. A Critical Engagement," 
Philosophy of the Sociul Sciences 23 (1993): 434. 
warm hearts rarely go with cool heads."lO' This called for a second kind 
of abstraction. Just as the different disciplines were studied in abstraction 
from one another, so too, the modernistic scientist needed to approach his 
or her problem with a "cool" intellectual spirit. If the problem cannot be 
studied in abstraction from all interests and personal concerns, 
modernists fear that research may be clouded and biased by other, 
nonscientific preoccupations. Toulmin concludes that modernistic 
disciplinary abstraction within the "sciences has brought in its train, also, 
a certain personal abstraction within the minds of working scientists."lo2 
New scientific developments in the twentieth century reject any 
assumption that scientists have to adopt a fully detached attitude. 
Scientists can no longer be spectators: The "scientist as spectator is dead. 
. . . Laplace's ideal of the Omniscient Calculator has failed us, even in the 
purest and most fundamental parts of physics." Toulmin states that to 
insist on subordinating "human" disciplines to the methodology of 
modernism is to make "the rational objectivity of the intellectual 
spectator into an idol."lo3 Within the new paradigm scientists become 
agents and servants rather than merely critical observers.lM A post-modern 
theology cannot separate practical and theoretical issues, so-called facts 
and values, cognition and action. The distinction between experts and 
"lay" persons cannot be seen in terms of a hierarchically-structured 
opposition. It needs to be differentiated on a continuum in terms of more 
or fewer "readings" of a text. The only difference between a lay and an 
expert reader of a text is, then, that the expert reader may have more 
arrangements of different tools and signs of the text than the 1ayperson.lo5 
A post-modern approach should thus be far more cautious about its 
"study-room-scientific" theories. C. W. du Toit's statement, that people's 
wisdom is a far safer guide than our scientific theories, should be a 
challenge to scholars in the new millennium to be far better "listeners" to 
and co-searchers of wisdom.lo6 
'04Toulmin states that "far from being free to sit in the stands and watch the action with 
official detachment, like the original theori at the classical Greek games, scientists today find 
themselves down in the dust of the arena, deeply involved in the actual proceedings" (252). 
lo5Van Niekerk, "Postmodern Theology," 12,13. 
lo6C. W. du Toit, Navorsing a waurheid?Aanpassings in die sistematiese teologze in die 
lig van veranderde kontekste (Pretoria: University of South Africa, 1995), 4. 
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Wisdom as Tmth Rather B a n  
Cognitive and Objective Tnrths 
Rorty states that Western culture and tradition focus on the notion 
of the search for truth. This is the clearest example of where one is 
turning away from solidarity to objectivity in order to make sense of 
one's existence. The idea of "truth as something to be pursued for its own 
sake, not because it will be good for oneself, or for one's real or imaginary 
community, is the central theme of this tradition."lo7 In conservative 
denominations the unshakable belief in truth, even truth as cognitive 
truth per se, stands out. Most often this search for truth is based on a 
positivistic approach: These truths can be "provedn either by empirical 
research or by biblical texts.'"* It is also assumed that these "truths" will 
protect against relativism.lo9 
More and more scholars believe that much of our knowledge has not 
been "for good" but "for evil" and is inclined to be dehumanizing. They 
regard the dominant epistemology of the West as violent, elitist, and 
exclusive. It is naive about its own context, and follows a technical 
rationality without sound ethical norms; it is exclusive and privatized and 
is "working hand-in-glove with o w  worst oppressions and most repressive 
Many scholars have constructed their theologies to a large 
extent on the possibility of an "absolute truth.""' This has to a large 
107Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity," 574. 
'08Fundamentalist absolutism stems from the Philosophy of Scottish Common Sense 
Realism. The Bible is seen as a reservoir of facts that can afford us with an objective 
perspective on the world (Tutorial Letter 103/1988,42). 
'OSAstley says that we must distinguish between the debate about relativism and the issues 
of relativity. The philosophers of the Enlightenment appealed to an abstracted and culture-free 
notion of rationality (257). Runzo distinguishes between different types of relativistic theses. He 
defines "relativism" as "any epistemological position which holds or entails that the correctness 
or incorrectness of judgement about matters of truth or value varies with which individual, or 
set of individuals . . . is making judgements." Runzo describes this position as. cognitive 
relativism, making a distinction within cognitive relativism between "socidlydefined conceptual 
relativism and an individualistic subjectivism." He also distinguishes between cognitive relativism 
and epistemological relativism, and between cognitive relativism and value relativism. Astley also 
discusses the objections to relativism, inter aliu, the "self-stultdying" argument-relativism 
destroying itself. The everyday criticism against relativism is that it leads to skepticism and moral 
anarchy and can result in absurd claims (Reason, Relativism and God [New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 19861). 
"'Scholars within the modem paradigm cannot help falling prey to the search for objective 
truths. From my perspective, Ellen G. White does not put the same emphasis on truth as 
absolute objective truth. She speaks of "God's truth," "eternal truth," "Bible truth," "sacred 
truth," "the truth as it is in Jesus," "present truth," etc. She does not, however, seem to state that 
extent become a search for cognitive and dogmatic truth. This "truth" is 
not only determined by rationalism, instrumentalism, and mechanism; 
but it is also often emptied of love, integrity, commitment, and solidarity. 
The twentieth century has witnessed the triumph and decline of the 
notion of truth defined by a mechanistic and reductionistic worldview. 
Even the natural sciences, the so-called exact disciplines, are now regarded 
as relative projects, influenced to a large extent by social ideologies and 
attitudes.l12 According to du Toit, we cannot construct theological 
pointers without seeking "truth." These cannot, however, be absolute 
"truths," but only "important truths." Rorty does not argue that there is 
no such thing as truth, but proposes that we should drop the idea of truth 
as somewhere out there waiting to be discovered. He states: "It is to say 
that our purposes would be served best by ceasing to see truth as a deep 
matter, as a topic of philosophical interest, or 'true' as a term which 
repays 'analysis.'"113 E. McKnight urges us to speak of "truthfulness* 
rather than truth. He points that we no longer arrive at a "truth" over 
against us, but at "truth which touches us."'" Truth demands 
t r~ th fu lness .~~~  Truth is not a metaphysical phenomenon; it is influenced 
by time, culture, tradition, language, and society.l16 
truth is final, absolute, and mechanistic, nor that it cannot further open up its rich and dynamic 
dimensions to us. Truth, then, is certainly not cognitive knowledge. In the Advent Reviere, and 
Sabbath Herald she states: "The disciples were put in close connection with eternal, essential 
truth; for it was laid open to their understanding; but they faded to comprehend it in its fullness, 
and although the living oracles are in our hands, although we have some understanding of the 
inspired books of the Old and New Testaments, there is much that even in our day we do not 
see and comprehendn (15 November 1892). White's designation of truth as present truth seems 
to me a viable option that can help us to move beyond mechanistic and static perceptions of 
truth. It may also prevent us from falling into the trap of relativism. 
l12See C. W. du Toit, "The End of Truth," in New Modes of Thinking on the Eve of a New 
Century: South A f i a  Perspectives, 33.  
"'Richard R o q  maintains that ~ietzche has cadconfusion by moving from "truth is not 
a matter of correspondence to realityn to "what we call 'truths' are just lies." He says that the same 
confusion is sometimes found in Derrida's statement that "there is no re* as the metaphysicians 
have hoped to hd."  Such confusions make Nietz.de and Derrida kable to charges of self- 
referential inconsistency-duming to know what they themselves claim cannot be known ("From 
the Contingency of Language," in PostmodemtsmA Readw, ed. Patricia Waugh b n d o n :  Edward 
Arnold, 19941, 174). 
"'Stanley Hauerwas, "Why the Truth Demands Truthfulness: An Imperious 
Engagement with Hart," in Why Narrative? Reddings in Narrative Theology, ed. Stanley 
Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 303-310. 
l16Du Toit, Navorsing en waurhetd?Aanpassings in die sistematiese teologie in die lig van 
veranderde kontekste, 7 .  
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It may be a fruitful endeavor to experiment with Groome's wisdom 
metaphor instead of the truth metaphor. Groome maintains that wisdom is 
more wholistic and historically-grounded concept than cognition and 
knowledge. Wisdom refers to our identity and "agencyn in the world. 
Therefore, wise people will not only have knowledge of one kind or another, 
"but far beyond that, such people are wise in their very being, and this 
includes their thoughts, desires, and The wisdom metaphor seems 
to be also more in keeping with the biblical tradition.l18 It may help us to 
transcend the limitations of Western epistemology, because it has included and 
moved beyond mere knowledge to an epistemology based on care rather than 
on rational certainty, an epistemology based on solidarity rather than 
object i~i t~."~ 
Instead of relying on rationalism and empiricism to supply scholars with 
absolute and objective certainties, faith ensured the certainty of conviction. 
Faith, however, was progressively given a rationalistic content, and later 
reason was divorced from faith, resulting in a divorce of "reasonable" religion 
from experience. Louis Duprk and Jacqueline Mariiia maintain that Kant's 
philosophy has introduced the end of reasonable deductions about the 
existence of God.120 Kant, in Critique of Pure Reason, stated that he "found it 
necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith."121 
ll*Ibid., 216218. According to Groome, " wisdom's locus was always the kb." Although 
this term is often translated as "heart," it in fact refers to the very "core" of a person (Ed 10:3). 
The kb is the intellectual source of thought and reflection (Isa 6:10), the center of affections (Ps 
4 3 ,  and the seat of volition and conscience (1 Sam 24:5). Thus, biblical wisdom, which is 
situated in the kb, pertains to one's head, heart, and hands. In the post-Exilic period, the 
emphasis is on wisdom as an ethical response to God's revelation and law. Wisdom is a gh of 
God, but it brings responsibility to so live (Job 28). Wise people do God's will, and they 
especially promote justice, compassion, and peace (Prov 2). Groome says that a focus on wisdom 
"would encourage our enterprise to be ontic, to be wholrstic and wholesome, to be humanizing 
and life-giving, to be inclusive." 
llgRorty maintains that "people seeking for solidarity are seeing the gap between uuth and 
justification . . . simply as the gap between the actual good and the possible better. From a 
pragmatist point of view, to say that what is rational for us now to believe may not be true, is 
simply to say that somebody may come up with a better idea. It is to say that there is always room 
for improved belief, since new evidence for new hypotheses, or a whole new vocabulary, may 
come along. For a prapatkt, the desire for objectivity is not the desire to escape the limitatons of 
one's community, but simply the desire for as much intersubjective agreement as possible, the desire 
to errtend the reference of 'us' as far as we can" ("Solidarity or Objectivity," 575). 
lZOLouis Duprk and Jacqueline Mariiia, "The Concept of Faith in Philosophy," in 
Handbook of Faith, ed. J. M. Lee (Birmingham, AL: Religious Education Press, 1990), 65. 
lZ'Imrnanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1929), 29. 
Dzflerentiation Instead of a 
Critical Approach 
Post-modern scholarship is questioning the modernistic hierarchical 
oppositions, interalia of the "surface" and "depth" dimensions of "things." 
Dualisms such as subject/object, thought/emotion, scientific/common are 
distorted forms of knowledge. Although post-modernity wants to exceed 
the conceptual binary oppositions of modernism, it wishes to keep the 
products of these myriad reductions and scrutinize the experiential 
"continuum" that articulates these opposing points. From a differentiated 
point of view these modern binary oppositions of "essence" (depth) and 
"appearance" (surface) become adjacent surfaces. In this regard Jacques 
Derrida's "dzfbance" is he1pf~l.l~~ Instead of tolerating these oppositions 
Derrida focuses on difference, the space between two oppositions. He 
wishes "to see what indicates that each of the two terms must appear as the 
dzflhance of the other: the one as the difference of the other, deferred or 
delayed in the economy of the same contin~um."'~~ This shows the need for 
dfferentiation rather than a traditional critical approach. 
A Postmodernism Vision: Pointers 
Instead of Pillars 
J. Wentzel van Huyssteen states that both modernism and 
postmodernism have been unable to come to terms with the issue of 
rationality. He thus proposes a postfoundationalist position over against the 
so-called objectivism of foundationalism and the extreme relativism of 
nonfoundationalism. Postfoundationalism wishes to fully acknowledge the 
context, the epistemical role of interpreted experience and tradition and its 
"shaping of epistemic and non-epistemic values that inform our reflection 
about both God and the world." A postfoundational position, however, also 
needs to challenge rationalism, foundationalism, and progress beyond the local 
122See in this regard John D. Caputo, ed., Deconstruaion in a Nutshel1:A Conversation with 
Jacques Dwnda (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997),96-105. Degenaar maintains that 
the "word dzfhance is derived from the term dtfier which means both to differ and to defer, 
postpone and delay. . . . It designates three aspects of writing: a 'passive' difference which has 
already been made and available to the subject; and [an] act of differing which produces 
differences; and an act of deferring which refers to the provisionality of distinctions and to the 
fact that the use of language entails the interminable interrelationships in signs." According to 
Derrida, "'Dtfhance' is the systematic play of ddferences, of the traces of differences, of the 
spacing (espacement) by which elements relate to one another" ("Deconstruction-The 
Celebration of Language," 197-198). 
I2'Van Niekerk, "Postmodern Theology," 3. 
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community and its culture.12' M. Serres argues that beneath a phenomenon 
and the information that we have of it, there is an infinite possibility and 
multiplicity that cause us to conclude that "what is knowable and what is 
known are born of the unknown."lZ5 In this regard it is also imperative to take 
cognizance of Cilliers' statement, that postmodernism is inherently sensitive 
to complexity. He argues that the price we pay for this sensitivity is high in 
terms of a conventional approach, because it means abandoning the search for 
universal criteria of truth and judgment. This may cause a feeling of loss, but 
the nostalgia for absolute criteria has kept us from being involved with our 
world in a responsible way.126 For conservative theology it will be even harder 
to take cognizance of the "chaos theory."12' Thls theory has moved beyond 
logical positivism and critical rationalism (to verify or to falsify) and 
Newtonian mechanism, and is in search of a new epistemology and a 
postcritical philosophy. The chaos theory has demonstrated that things are far 
more complex than "Scottish Common Sense Realism" p re tends them to 
be.lZ8 Newtonian science handled chaos in our world by inserting the order 
124Van Huyssteen, 580-581. Whereas in modernism the stereotypical ways of relating 
theology and science need to be replaced, Van Huyssteen argues that postmodernist pluralism 
makes it almost impossible even to speak about theology, religion, and rationality. Charles 
Scriven maintains that the foundational ideas cannot be fully secured beyond question 
(Namey Murphy, "Schooling for the Tournament of Narratives: Postmodernism and the 
Idea of the Christian College," in Theology without Foundations: Religious Practice and the 
Future of Theologtcal Truth, ed. Stanley Hauerwas, Nancey Murphy, and Mark Nation 
[Nashville: Abingdon Press, 19941,281). 
12'M. Serres, "Noise," Substance 12 (1983) : 54. 
126Cilliers tates that in dealing with complex systems we cannot use traditional analytical 
approaches, because the "nature" of such systems as the human brain, language, and society is 
"determined" by many elements that interact in dynamic and nonlinear ways (124). 
127James Gleick, B e  Miding of a New Science (New York: Viking, 1987). Three scientists 
stand out as the pioneers of chaos theory: Edward Lorenz, Benoit Mandelbrot, and Mitchell 
Feigenbaum; see also F. LeRon Shults, "A Theology of Chaos: An Experiment in Postmodern 
Theological Science," Scottish Jouml of Theology 45 (1992): 223-235; A. Gerhard van Wyk, 
"Methodological Challenges Facing Seventh-day Adventist Theology in the Year 2000: A 
Practical-theological Perspective," paper read at the SEDATA Annual Meeting, Helderberg 
College, 13 October 1996,l-14. Many of the proponents of the chaos theory claim that it is the 
third great scientific revolution of the twentieth century, coming after quantum theory and 
Einstein's theory of relativity, which dissolved the Newtonian dogma of absolute space and time. 
The chaos theory has eradicated Laplace's illusion of deterministic predictability. Shults says that 
while "relativity describes the macroscopic and quantum theory, the microscopic view of nature, 
the theory of chaos applies to the study of objects on a human scale, to the world we experience 
with our senses every day." Chaotic behavior has been discovered in systems such as the orbit 
of planas (Pluto), the rhythm of hearts (healthy hearts show sometimes more variability than 
sick ones), and the neural activity of the brain. 
lZ8Shults concludes that although chaos seems to permeate our universe, our theology 
and control of God, but where irregularity prevailed led to a "God of the 
gaps." Modernistic empirical scientists explained these irregularities with their 
positivistic approach until frnally they stated with Laplace, "God was no 
longer needed." New science has determined, however, that thls world cannot 
be explained by its own intrinsic order-our universe is indeed ~ 0 n t i n ~ e n t . l ~ ~  
These developments are challenging conservative theologies to replace 
the modernistic metaphor of "pillars of truth" and to speak rather of an 
episodic "pointer system."130 This is not to limit the importance of beliefs, 
but to move beyond Newtonian mechanics and to provide it with far 
greater potential. 
Van Niekerk maintains that the difference between a modernistic and a 
post-modern approach can be found in the difference between the conduit 
metaphor and the "toolmaker's" paradigm.131 He states that in contrast with 
the conduit metaphor, in the "toolmaker's" metaphor we have "an immense 
workplace filled with tools which serve as units of communicative 
transference both between people and between texts and people."1" A reading 
scope is constituted between text and context which provides ample tools, 
such as cultural signs and pointers, words and concepts, meanings and ideas, 
~roducts and ~hysical phenomena. This entails a complex relationship 
between text and reader, but it does not matter, as there can be no success 
without effort. It does not aspire to "the correct interpretation," but rather to 
can still be a theology of hope. Out of this chaos "God's redemptive order will emerge on 
a hlgher level and will ultimately be consumed in the eschatological fulfilment of a new 
heaven and a new earth" (233). 
lZ9Tracy maintains that postmodernity's attack on the self-confidence of modernity 
provided a new opportunity for "serious contemporary thought on God. . . . Indeed, 
postmodernity tends to be suspicious of almost all traditional and modern arguments on the 
existence of God, all attempts to fit God's reality into a modern horizon of intelligibility, all 
of the famous 'isms' for God, from deism and theism through panentheism" (42-43). 
'Van Niekerk, "Postmodern Theology," 3. These pointers may give access to infinite 
differentiation, but they are "under construction for the 'duration' of a debate, the 'duration' 
of the composition of an essay, the 'duration' of reading a text." 
')'For a discussion of the conduit metaphor see van Niekerk, "Postmodern Theology," 
8-9. Although the conduit metaphor made communication possible between sendedreceiver 
and vice wsa, the one-way traffic stayed in place. Only one correct reading of a text is 
possible. See also M. J. Reddy, "The Conduit Metaphor-A Case of Frame Conflict in Our 
Language about Language," in Metaphorand i%ought, ed. A. Onony (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), 284-324. 
132Van Niekerk, "Postmodern Theology," 13. 
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a "good interpretation" for a particular purpose.'33 
Conclusion: A N m  Vision of Science and 
Scholarship as nServanthood" 
Modernism opts for a leveling of differences, whereas a post-modern 
vision prefers a networking negotiation of differences. The "antagonism 
of identity" needs to be replaced by the "agonism of difference."'" The 
principle of the negotiation of differences is imperative. Modernistic 
discourse privileges a Western rationality, while a post-modern vision 
wishes to explore the significance of different lifestyles and perspectives 
and thus warns against imperialism. 
The modernistic scholar may be regarded as a "divine overseer" in the 
sense of the Platonic-divine Theoros. He or she knows what everyone is 
believing, thinking, imagining, and feeling. He or she is the "subject" that 
knows the "object" in an absolute and objective way. Post-modernists, in 
contrast, ask: Should we not rather seek for truth and wisdom as solving 
a crossword puzzle instead of problem-solving in terms of a critical 
rationalistic approach?'3s The post-modern scholar can be regarded as one 
who is a participant in seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling, and doing with 
others of his or her society while negotiating, confronting, fragmenting, 
linking, and accommodating other discourses episodically.'36 This seems 
to indicate that within a post-modern paradigm the role and task of the 
scholar are going to change radically. 
Instead of being informers about objective facts, post-modernists hope 
that scholars will become more like servants, more like listeners. They 
will overcome the dichotomy that Kant forged between practical and 
theoretical reason and consequently between ethics and science. Scholars 
will become conscious about the political power of knowledge. The 
binary oppositions such as male/female, mindbody, subject/object, 
thought/emotion, scientific/common, husk/kernel are hierarchically 
positioned, favoring the former over the latter. These distorted forms of 
knowledge can be destructive for all, even for those in power. 
Post-modernists envision that the relations between scholars, 
students, and laypeople will change. Their goal is to have less a knowing 
13'Degenaar, 7he Collapse of Unity, 19. Antagonism forces one to conquer, while 
agonism wishes to accept, challenge, and accommodate others' differing perspectives. 
'j5See Nancey Murphy, "Truth, Relativism, and Crossword Puzzles," Zygon 24 (1989): 
299-3 14. 
''Wan Niekerk, "Lnaugural Lecture," 38. 
scholar informing others, but one who will interact in mutual exploration 
of relevant issues. Authority will then shift from an external to a 
communal and dialogue sphere. This movement will focus more on the 
process and on emerging patterns than on the course run, without 
splitting this process nor the course in a dichotomous way. Within the 
machine-orientated paradigm the scholar was the driver and the students 
the audience, at best. At worst, the passengers are the objects being driven. 
The students or "priesthood of believers" cannot be removed from a 
meaningful interaction with the scholar. 
Post-modernists envision that scholars will become people who are 
listening to the experience of the total ecosystem, its wonder, its silence, its 
voices, its songs, its hopes, its pains, its visions, and missions. The scholar as 
servant will not in the first instance focus on dualistic and mechanistic rules 
and regulations to make absolute statements. Scholars will be guided by an 
epistemology based on an ethic of care and will construct knowledge that 
is humanizing and able to touch every aspect of people's lives. 
